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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRUCE N. MOORE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 971259-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop, interference with an arresting 
officer, and assault on a police officer. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (f) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defendant's probation officer have reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant as he was driving along a road, where 
for four consecutive months defendant had failed to report to the 
probation officer and where defendant had not responded to any of 
the officer's previous attempts to reach him by phone or mail? 
An appellate court reviews a reasonable suspicion 
determination under a correction of error standard with "a 
1 
measure of discretion to the trial judge." State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the evidence support defendant's conviction for 
resisting arrest, where the evidence demonstrated that, even 
after defendant admittedly knew peace officers were present, he 
continued to violently kick and struggle, and to verbally abuse 
and threaten the officers, and refused to get into the police 
car? 
"In reviewing a jury verdict to determine if it was based on 
sufficient evidence, [an appellate court] view[s] the evidence 
presented and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. Where there is any 
evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
it, from which the findings of all the elements of the crime can 
be made beyond a reasonable doubt, [the] inquiry is complete and 
[the Court] will sustain the verdict." State v. Gardner, 789 
P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted), cert, denied 110 
S.Ct. 1837 (1990). 
3. Has defendant preserved a claim of self defense where he 
failed to raise such an argument before the trial court and has 
asserted neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on 
appeal? 
Where an issue has been waived, no standard of review 
applies. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5, governing failure to respond 
an officer's signal to stop, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) An operator who, having received a 
visual or audible signal from a peace officer 
to bring his vehicle to a stop . . . attempts 
to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle 
or other means is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4, governing assault against a 
peace officer, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace 
officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305, governing interference with a 
arresting officer, provides: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a 
peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another 
and interferes with the arrest or detention 
by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to 
perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or 
detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved 
in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's . . . refusal 
to refrain from performing any act that would 
impede the arrest or detention. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one third degree felony for 
failing to respond to an officer's signal to stop, one class B 
misdemeanor for resisting arrest, and two class A misdemeanors 
for assaulting a police officer (R. 19-21). After a trial by 
jury, defendant was convicted of all the charges except one of 
the class A misdemeanors. The court sentenced him to zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison on the felony charge, and one 
year and six months in jail on the misdemeanors, all sentences to 
run concurrently (R. 364-66). The court also levied fines 
totaling $2250 (Id.). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal 
(R. 367-68). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
In late May of 1995, Department of Corrections probation and 
parole officer Brad Draper became defendant's probation 
supervisor (R. 499, 503). On June 8th, both defendant and Draper 
appeared in court at an order to show cause hearing arising from 
probation violations committed by defendant (R. 502-03, 777). In 
response to these violations, the court extended defendant's 
probation for an additional twelve months (R. 502). 
As a term of his original probation, defendant was required 
to report to the Department of Corrections by the 5th of each 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah 
1992). 
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month (R. 499). Following the June 8th hearing, however, 
defendant failed to report at all (R. 498-99, 484-86). Officer 
Draper tried on multiple occasions to contact defendant by letter 
and by telephone, but to no avail (R. 498-99, 484-89). 
On October 17, 1995, after having had no contact with 
defendant since his appearance in court on June 8th, Officer 
Draper recognized defendant driving in his truck in Roosevelt. 
Draper maneuvered his vehicle behind defendant's and activated 
his red and blue visor lights, which emitted a continuous series 
of quick, high intensity flashes (R. 483-84). When defendant 
pulled over to the shoulder of the road, Draper approached him to 
find out why he had not been reporting on a monthly basis, or why 
he had not responded to Draper's multiple calls and letters (R. 
483). Draper wanted to know "if [defendant] had a 
misunderstanding [or] if he just wasn't going to comply" (Id.). 
To that end, Draper questioned defendant about his 
probation. Defendant responded, "I quit and nobody can force me 
to go" (R. 482, 753). Draper gave defendant a direct order not 
to leave and opened the driver's side door of defendant's truck 
(R. 481, 752). Defendant responded by slamming the door and 
stating, "I have a meeting to go to." He then sped off (R. 481, 
752) . 
Draper returned to his vehicle, visor lights still flashing, 
and followed defendant, reporting back to dispatch that a chase 
5 
was in progress and requesting back-up (R. 480). Defendant drove 
to the Division of Family Services building, pulled cock-eyed 
into a parking stall, got out of his car, locked it, and headed 
for the building (R. 478-79). Draper pulled in behind him, 
blocking his exit, and confronted defendant because he "didn't 
want this situation going inside the building" (R. 478) . When 
Draper approached him, defendant stated, "Get out of my way, 
Draper, or I will fuck you up" (R. 477). Draper then put his 
hand up and told defendant twice that he was under arrest and to 
"cuff up" (R. 444, 478). As soon as Draper made physical contact 
with defendant to handcuff him, defendant grabbed Draper around 
the head (Id.). Draper attempted to execute a "hair pull take 
down," but was unable to do so (R. 476-77). 
Officer Draper, at 185 pounds, was significantly smaller 
than defendant (R. 741).2 Consequently, while Draper was able to 
break free of defendant's grip several times, defendant succeeded 
in reestablishing a headlock each time (R. 438, 455-56, 476). 
Defendant was yelling obscenities and, despite Draper's continued 
announcements that he was under arrest, defendant continued to 
hold Draper and to refuse to "verbally settle down" (R. 476). 
All Draper could do was try to limit defendant's movements (Id.). 
2
 Defendant weighed 280 pounds and was described by 
witnesses as "a big guy" or "a pretty strong guy" (R. 438, 455, 
477, 741). He had been a high school wrestling champion and, 
despite some long-term physical disabilities, still retained good 
upper body strength (R. 763-64). 
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At this juncture, two uniformed back-up officers arrived on 
the scene (R. 437, 438, 457, 466, 471, 476). One of them, the 
Roosevelt City police chief, described "an aggressive kind of 
situation. The defendant. . . was saying foul, abusive things, 
threatening. He was very aggressive at the time. . . Very 
agitated" (R. 456). The other back-up officer recalled that 
"Agent Draper [said], *You are under arrest. You are under 
arrest.' The defendant . . . was screaming some profanities, 
refusing to be, to submit to the arrest. And it was a pretty 
violent struggle going on there by the truck when I got there" 
(R. 438). 
Given defendant's size and strength, in order to regain 
control, the back-up officers brought him to the ground (R. 438, 
455, 471). On his stomach, defendant tucked his hands tightly 
against his chest (R. 437, 470). Eventually, the officers forced 
his arms out and handcuffed him (Id.). Defendant continued to 
struggle. One of the back-up officers testified, "He was 
screaming violently, screaming, making threats he was going to 
kill everybody" (R. 437). Finally, after he kicked one of the 
officers in the chest, he was put in leg restraints (R. 437, 454, 
469) . 
Restrained by both handcuffs and shackles, defendant 
nonetheless refused to cooperate with the police. As Draper 
observed, "Every movement we would make, he would do something 
7 
against it" (R. 468). Rejecting the officers' request to get up, 
defendant went rigid on the ground, refusing even to sit up (R. 
435). The officers ultimately stood defendant up, "just like a 
post," and carried him over to the police car (Id.). When the 
officers asked defendant to get into the back seat of the 
vehicle, he replied, "F-U. I am not going to do it" (R. 435). 
The three officers then loaded defendant into the car by sliding 
his rigid body, stomach down, onto the back seat. Because 
defendant was taller than the car was wide, his feet stuck out of 
the vehicle. When the officers tried to lift his legs to get the 
door closed, "[h]e would scream and yell "F-U" and straighten his 
body out again" (R. 434). For both officer safety and to prevent 
injury to defendant, one of the officers then used a stun gun to 
administer an electronic shock behind defendant's knees in order 
to get him to bring his legs into the car (R. 434, 453, 467). 
The doors were then closed, and defendant was "sent . . . on his 
way" to the police station (R. 433-34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues first that he was not legally on probation 
and that, consequently, the probation officer did not have 
probable cause to stop him. This argument fails not only on the 
basis of waiver, but also on the merits. No record evidence 
suggests that defendant was not on probation. And, in any event, 
the proper standard for this stop and detention is reasonable 
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suspicion, not probable cause. The facts in this case amply 
support the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant was in 
violation of the terms of his probation agreement, thus 
justifying both the initial stop and subsequent detention. 
Defendant also argues that, in order to convict him of 
resisting arrest, the State must establish both that defendant 
had knowledge of the arresting party's status as a peace officer 
and that the arrest was lawful. In this case, defendant himself 
testified that he had actual knowledge that Roosevelt City police 
officers were present when he was on the ground, and that most of 
the struggle occurred after that point. Defendant's testimony 
itself thus defeats his argument on appeal. As to the lawfulness 
of the arrest, even if it had been unlawful, it would not have 
legally justified defendant's violent conduct towards the police. 
Finally, defendant's argument that he was statutorily 
justified in resisting arrest fails both because it is waived and 
because the statutory justification defenses do not apply to 
claims of resisting arrest. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION OFFICER HAD 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP HIM, 
WHERE FOR FOUR MONTHS DEFENDANT HAD 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF 
HIS PROBATION AGREEMENT AND WHERE 
DEFENDANT HAD NOT RESPONDED TO ANY 
OF HIS AGENT'S REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO 
CONTACT HIM 
The gist of defendant's argument seems to be that defendant 
had no legal obligation to report to Officer Draper because 
defendant was not subject to a valid probation agreement at the 
time. Furthermore, for the same reason, Draper lacked probable 
cause to stop him (Br. of App. at 4-6). 
Defendant's argument fails on a variety of grounds. First, 
defendant argued in the trial court that he had neither "agreed" 
to any extension of his original probation nor signed any new 
documents committing him to report (R. 759, 771).3 He did not 
argue, as he does now, that the extension of his probation 
agreement was statutorily unlawful. Consequently, because 
defendant is raising a new argument for the first time on appeal, 
Without any record support, defendant claims that he 
"explicitly objected to the terms of any extension at the June 8, 
1995 hearing" (Br. of App. at 6). He has not, however, included 
a transcript of that hearing as part of the record on appeal. 
Consequently, his bare assertion will not suffice to preserve the 
claim. See, e.g., State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 
1993) ("This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends 
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record"). 
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that argument is waived. State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 294 n.l 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Furthermore, the position defendant now asserts is contrary 
to the position asserted by defense counsel at trial. Indeed, in 
objecting to a line of questioning initiated by the State, 
defense counsel stated, "It's a given fact in this case that Mr. 
Moore is on probation. I think . . . Officer Draper has 
testified as to why he pulled him over because he was on 
probation. I don't think we need to go any further back into 
that issue" (R. 776).4 By specifically acknowledging defendant's 
status as a probationer, the defense has precluded the argument 
that he was not on probation. The law is well-settled that 
"[t]he doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting 
up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" 
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting 
State v. Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)(noting that the rule 
"discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial 
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal"). 
Defendant's only remaining contention is the lawfulness of 
Officer Draper's stop of defendant. Once again, this issue was 
not argued before the trial court and is, consequently, waived. 
4
 Although defense counsel was acting in an advisory 
capacity, he participated actively and regularly during the 
trial. 
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See, e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah 
App. 1990) ("It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a party 
must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its 
right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings"). Even on 
the merits, however, the argument fails. Even if defendant had 
not properly been on probation, the correct standard for 
analyzing the propriety of the stop would be reasonable suspicion 
and not, as defendant asserts, probable cause (Br. of App. at 6-
7). That is, a peace officer can lawfully stop any citizen on 
the road when the officer can point to specific, articulable 
facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from those 
facts, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the 
individual may be involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968); accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
541 (Utah App. 1990); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995). 
In this case, Officer Draper plainly had reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant. Assigned as defendant's probation 
officer, Draper knew that defendant had not reported in, as his 
probation agreement required, for more than four months. Nor had 
Draper been successful in initiating contact with defendant 
either by mail or telephone. Under such circumstances, when 
Draper saw defendant driving in Roosevelt City, he had ample 
reason to believe that defendant was in violation of the terms of 
his probation agreement. See State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 529-
12 
30 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Utah 
App. 1996) . Consequently, he was justified in stopping him to 
investigate the matter further. Defendant's argument to the 
contrary is, therefore, without merit. 
POINT TWO 
THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR RESISTING ARREST 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE AMPLY 
DEMONSTRATED THAT, EVEN AFTER 
DEFENDANT ADMITTEDLY KNEW POLICE 
OFFICERS WERE PRESENT, HE CONTINUED 
TO VERBALLY ATTACK AND PHYSICALLY 
STRUGGLE WITH THE POLICE OFFICERS 
The gist of defendant's argument is that, in order to 
convict him of resisting arrest, the State must establish both 
that defendant had knowledge of the arresting party's status as a 
peace officer and that the arrest was lawful (Br. of App. at 7). 
In this case, defendant argues, the State only demonstrated that 
he knew Officer Draper was a probation officer, not a peace 
officer. Furthermore, defendant asserts, the arrest itself "was 
in fact unlawful" (Id. at 8). For these reasons, he believes the 
State adduced insufficient evidence to convict him. 
In reviewing a jury's verdict for sufficiency, an appellate 
court's role is limited. It does not sit as a "second fact 
finder" nor does it determine the credibility of the witnesses. 
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Indeed, an 
appellate court will only reverse for insufficiency when the 
13 
evidence is so inconclusive that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that the defendant committed the 
crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), 
superseded by rule on other grounds. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant's argument fails both because he has improperly 
interpreted the controlling statute and because he has 
selectively applied the facts to the law as he interprets it. 
The statute governing interference with an arresting officer 
provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty if he "has 
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305. 
First, defendant assumes that the State must prove he had actual 
knowledge, thus ignoring the important alternative phrase, "by 
the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge." Id. 
Under either alternative, however, the evidence was sufficient to 
convict him. 
As to actual knowledge, defendant himself testified that, 
after he was on the ground and handcuffed, he knew Roosevelt City 
police officers were present (R. 761-62). He further testified 
that most of the struggle occurred after he was handcuffed, when 
the officers tried to get him to stand up in order to transport 
him in the police vehicle (R. 781). Defendant's own testimony 
14 
thus established the element of knowledge that he now contests. 
That is, apart from the initial confrontation with Officer 
Draper, defendant's subsequent violent interactions with persons 
he knew to be peace officers sufficed to establish that defendant 
knew that peace officers were seeking to arrest him.5 
As to knowledge defendant should have had by the exercise of 
reasonable care, the evidence was similarly sufficient. Even 
before the city police officers arrived, defendant should have 
known that Draper was a peace officer. Officer Draper was 
defendant's probation agent, responsible for supervising 
defendant and monitoring compliance with the terms of his 
probation agreement (R. 504) .6 As a probation agent, Draper was 
authorized to make arrests and "to conduct field stops to make 
sure [probationers] are in compliance with their probation" (R. 
475, 504). In his official capacity, Draper had met with 
defendant in May of 1995 and had appeared with him in court the 
next month at an order to show cause hearing arising from 
probation violations (R. 499, 503). At the time of this 
encounter, when Draper turned on his high intensity, blue and red 
Defendant's actual knowledge also supports his conviction 
for assault against a police officer, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102.4. 
6
 Defendant has not included as part of the record on 
appeal either the actual probation agreement or the trial court 
order extending it. Consequently, any argument based on either 
document is waived. Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67. 
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flashing visor lights, he was in uniform, wearing a blue shirt 
with a tie and brown pants, carrying a gun in a holster and a 
badge on his belt (R. 473-74). 
Moreover, if Draper's appearance and occupation were 
insufficient to establish that defendant reasonably should have 
known that he was being detained by a peace officer, the arrival 
of the two back-up officers plainly settled the matter. Both of 
the officers, one of whom had been the Roosevelt City chief of 
police for 17 years, were in uniform (R. 437, 448, 457). After 
defendant had been handcuffed and shackled, the officers backed 
off, thus giving defendant the opportunity to fully observe the 
officers and reassess his conduct (R. 436, 469). Defendant, 
however, subsequently refused to walk to the police car, refused 
to get into the car, and continued to threaten the officers 
verbally (R. 435). Such conduct, when defendant reasonably 
should have known peace officers were arresting him, plainly 
fulfilled the statutory requirements. 
Second, defendant's contention that he is not culpable for 
his actions because the arrest was unlawful is wholly 
unpersuasive on the merits since even an unlawful arrest would 
not have justified defendant's conduct. This Court has plainly 
rejected the proposition, now asserted by defendant, that "a 
person may invoke the statutory justification defenses against a 
charge of resisting arrest." State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 616 
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(Utah 1997) (citing Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); State v. Gardiner, 
814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991)). Indeed, Alonzo specifically ratified 
Smooths holding that "the statutory justification defenses found 
in sections 76-2-401 to 406 of the Utah Code do not apply to 
claims of resisting arrest." Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 617 (quoting 
Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010). Consequently, defendant's argument 
must fail, and the verdict must be sustained. 
POINT THREE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT IS ARGUING FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT HE 
WAS STATUTORILY JUSTIFIED IN 
RESISTING ARREST AND HAS ASSERTED 
NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES AS A REASON FOR DOING 
SO, HIS CLAIM IS WAIVED 
Defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that he was 
statutorily justified in using force against the officers in 
order to defend himself (Br. of App. at 8-10). This is an 
entirely new argument, neither presented before nor ruled upon by 
the trial court. The law is well-settled that "[w]ith limited 
exceptions, the practice of [appellate courts] has been to 
decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on 
appeal." Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412, 
413 (Utah 1990). Absent exceptional circumstances or plain 
error, neither of which defendant has asserted in this case, 
defendant has waived consideration of a statutory self-defense 
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justification on appeal. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 
(Utah 1987). For this reason, this Court should decline to 
consider defendant's claim.7 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony; assault against a police officer, a 
class A misdemeanor; and interference with an arresting officer, 
a class B misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ]£_ day of July, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
C. MJc__ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
7
 In any event, the claim has no merit. See Salt Lake City 
v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 
(Utah 1996) (holding that the "'statutory justification defenses 
found in sections 76-2-401 to 406 of the Utah Code do not apply 
to claims of resisting arrest"). 
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